Revisiting Nelson and Trafalgar

Revisiting Nelson and Trafalgar

Now that 200 years have passed on one of the most famous naval battles that ever took place in history, it's time to look back and try to get a fresh look upon it. What made this battle so special? In order to answer to this question we must understand Nelson's history.

The Indo-Pakistan Wars – the maritime point of view

Indian carrier Vikrant played a key role in enforcing a naval blockade over East Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Ghazi was the only long range submarine operated by either of the warring nations in 1965. The sinking of PNS Ghazi played a point of turning role in Indian Naval operations in East Pakistan.

INS Khukri was a British Type 14 (Blackwood-class) frigate of the Indian Navy. She was sunk off the coast of Diu, Gujarat, India by the Pakistan Navy Daphne-class submarine Hangor on 9 December 1971 during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. This was the first warship sunk in action by a submarine since World War II. It remains the Indian navy’s only warship to be lost in war to date.

The departure of the British from the subcontinent in 1947 had left the borders of India and Pakistan demarcated fairly well except in the west along the Rann of Kutch where the great Indus river loses itself in a giant swamp with only a few clearly marked outlets into the sea. The northern portion of the border has always been turbulent owing to the invasion of Kashmir’s territory by Pakistan-sponsored tribesmen in a bid to absorb the state, of which the ruler was undecided which way he should accede in 1947. The subsequent war in 1948 resulted in a cease-fire line which has been active ever since. Pakistan, which is a theocratic state, claims Kashmir on the grounds that the population is predominantly Muslim. India rejects this claim as absurd particularly as secular India has more Muslims than Pakistan. The attitude adopted by Pakistani leaders since 1947 has been to focus the attention of its people on Kashmir as a `burning’ issue, thereby attempting to weld them together as a cohesive small nation threatened by a big bullying neighbour.

In early 1965, the ill-demarcated border in the Rann of Kutch was the scene of a fire fight which was later taken to the world court for adjudication. By May of that year, the month before the monsoon breaks, it was clear to the armed forces of both countries that the possibility of a conflagration existed and normal states of readiness were raised by each service according to its own procedures. These realistic steps were taken by everyone with the full knowledge that the border question in the Rann of Kutch was a red herring, a minor diversion intended to distract attention away from the real issue, which was Pakistan’s attempt to annex Kashmir.

Immediately after the monsoon began to peter out in northern India, Pakistani infiltrators in large numbers slipped into Kashmir where their co-religionists promptly gave them up to the Indian authorities. This operation, which had been planned and executed in secrecy from Pakistan over a number of months, failed catastrophically. To pull the chestnuts out of the fire, a regular Pakistan army blitzkrieg was launched opposite Jammu, with the intention of cutting the only Indian road link to Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. The possibility that this strike would succeed was real. The Indian army leadership had to launch a counteroffensive opposite Lahore to outflank the Pakistani thrust and relieve the pressure on Jammu. The war, although anticipated to some extent as a possible long-term outcome, therefore actually occurred in a time and place that initially caught the Indians, and later the Pakistanis, by surprise. The war, as an instrument of state policy, in this instance, was far from the sea, was fought over disputed territory and neither side had great staying power economically or industrially. The stamina of both sides was further reduced by the consequent international arms embargo imposed at the outbreak of war.

What kind of a sea war could have influenced this conflict? The Pakistan navy had a modest destroyer force, was in the process of inducting one submarine from the US and had its own integral maritime reconnaissance aircraft. The Indians had a larger navy, centred around the small carrier Vikrant supported by new anti-submarine and AD frigates-a navy which was a miniature version of a sea-control navy, modelled around the British concepts of maritime strategy. Whatever may have been its operational directives, neither fleet saw action, being content to protect the areas in which their own merchantmen plied. A Pakistan destroyer which lobbed a few shells on to the Indian coast in a high speed night sortie was the one night sensation of the naval war. Naval control of shipping and contraband control was attempted, but was not stringent enough to cause substantial economic damage.

A debrief of the war, certainly in India, showed that the comparative lack of action at sea had been caused by certain automatic adherence to a maritime strategy which spoke of sea control, commerce protection and other well-established principles of maritime warfare, the tenets on which the sea war in World War II had been conducted. Having been taught by the British, the Indian navy had also accepted many of the precepts on which the British Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (on loan to India in 1947-48) had formulated his plans for building the future navy. Explanations to the non-naval authorities on the undramatic role of the navy in the war, which ran into arguments on sea control and commerce protection, were politely disbelieved. Questions on the relevance of sea power in the kind of conflicts that India would fight in the next 25 years were also raised. These queries could naturally be expected to have an adverse effect on the allocation of resources for the future navy. These facts need to be understood as the background for the war which occurred in 1971.

Pakistan, which had a western wing and an eastern wing separated by 1,000 miles of India, soon found itself fighting to preserve its unity as a nation, when the eastern wing wished to secede. The trouble erupted over the fact that the eastern wing felt economically neglected, a situation which they felt they could correct if their superior numbers could elect a majority in the combined parliament. This would influence the subsequent allotment of cabinet portfolios and allocation of central resources. West Pakistani elected representatives would not agree to a straightforward democratic parliament, and the civil strife in East Pakistan was suppressed with appalling brutality. Over ten million refugees migrated to India, a number far too large for India to absorb. When the United Nations and the world seemed unconcerned with the problem, the only solution appeared to be Indian intervention. This situation continued for the major part of 1971 after the initial suppression of civil revolt in the former East Pakistan occurred in March/April. In this instance, too, the armed contestants on both sides were fully aware of impending hostilities for almost six months and had sufficient time to work out detailed strategies.

The war broke out with a Pakistani attempt to carry out a preemptive air strike against Indian airfields in the west, and then both sides executed well-planned orders. All wars are unusual, but this one had its own special features, especially from the maritime point of view. The aim of the war would obviously be achieved only by soldiers in the eastern wing. However, an irrelevant land war would be fought in the west too, rather like a fishing expedition, to see what territories could be grabbed for use as bargaining tools at the end of the war. There were, therefore, two continental wars proceeding simultaneously, separated by 2,000 miles of ocean. For India it was therefore possible to exercise the classic role of sea control, encompassing sea denial, between the wings, but what could be the navy’s role in the wars in the wings themselves? For Pakistan, a successful defence in the east made sea communications between the wings an imperative, but this was so hopelessly impossible that it was not even attempted except by a couple of blockade runners which were captured and impounded.

The land war in the east lasted 11 days; the Pakistan navy fought, knowing it had no hope of help or reinforcement and no route of withdrawal. The fact that the sea was hostile must have played a major part in the psychology of Pakistani field commanders in the east. Although no major sea battle took place, Indian carrier-borne aircraft crippled or sank all available shipping in East Pakistani harbours.

The absence of major battles illustrates the classical Mahanian observation- that unobtrusive application of sea power achieves the end result in such an imperceptible fashion that the effect of sea power needs to be overemphasised for it to be understood. The Indian maritime strategy in the east was in sharp contrast to the strategy in the west, where an Indian flotilla of Petya class vessels towing Osa class missile boats attacked Karachi harbour and sank all vessels encountered there. The dramatic effect of the `enemy’ main base being battered so captured the imagination of the Indian government, the bureaucracy, the services and the people that the navy never had to explain what navies are for! The Pakistani navy, forever kept short of funds by the ruling army generals, eventually had a manpower ratio to the army of 1:45, making it the most unfavourable in the world. This statistic also proclaimed that in the strategic concepts prevailing in Islamabad in its pursuit to annex Kashmir, and in the inevitable bloody continental war with India, the Pakistani navy would play no role.

The Indians, on the other hand, have continued to build a balanced navy and should a continental war erupt once more, would have considerable time and experience in attempting to solve the question of how a navy can contribute to a continental war. From having learned that a pure ocean-oriented maritime strategy does not affect the outcome of a critical land war, India has learned that a pure Mahanian strategy is not relevant in the context of a land war over disputed territory. Then, what sort of strategy is? The uneducated section of the country can be satisfied by some action, any action. This takes care of the largest interest group- the people. What about the professionals? What about the pressures generated among the armed forces themselves over the pursuit and achievement of a common aim? This is a problem with which sea-going professionals in the subcontinent will have to grapple. It will be interesting to see what answers are found to all these questions; in fact, whether any answers will be found at all. What is evident is the need for a search, which may lead to the answer that other navies in similar situations also seek.

WAR OF THE PACIFIC

Huáscar is a 19th-century small armoured turret ship of a type similar to a monitor. She was built in Britain for Peru and played a significant role in the battle of Pacocha and the War of the Pacific against Chile before being captured and commissioned with the Chilean Navy. Today she is one of the few surviving ships of her type. The ship has been restored and is currently commissioned as a memorial ship. She is named after the 16th-century Inca emperor, Huáscar.

From 1874 to 1879, the South American nation of Chile experienced a depression caused by falling copper and wheat prices, a dropping off of exports, and rising unemployment. The only bright spot in the economy was the expanding nitrate business, but its mining eventually caused war between Chile and its neighbors, Peru and Bolivia. Nitrates were mined in the Atacama Desert along the Chile-Bolivia border. Most of the work was done by Anglo-Chilean companies, which operated in the Bolivian province of Antofagasta and the Peruvian province of Tarapaca. An 1866 treaty between Bolivia and Chile set their border at the 24th parallel, with both countries able to mine nitrates between the 23rd and 25th parallels; tax revenue collected by either country along the frontier would be split with the other country. This taxation arrangement was altered in 1874 when Chile agreed to give up its share of Bolivian tax revenue in return for a promise that taxes on Chilean profits in Bolivia would not be raised for 25 years.

Though Chile had no border with Peru, aggressive Chilean miners pushed into the Peruvian desert to mine nitrates. By 1875, some 10,000 people were employed in mining and subsidiary operations in the Peruvian Tarapaca desert region. Peru had thus far said little about the Anglo-Chilean operations in its province, but in 1875 a faltering economy forced the Peruvian government to nationalize the nitrate companies. The Peruvian government paid for the companies with government bonds paying 8 percent, payable in two years. When the bonds came due, the Peruvians were unable to honor their financial commitments and the bonds’ value plummeted. The Anglo-Chilean companies were able to absorb the loss of the Peruvian assets, but when the Bolivians decided in 1878 to raise taxes on the Chileans along the frontier in violation of the 1876 agreement, the loss of profits was too much to take. Chile refused to pay the higher taxes even when Bolivia threatened to nationalize the operations as the Peruvians had done. According to the 1876 agreement, an arbitrator should have been called in to handle the dispute, but Bolivia refused. The Bolivian government felt secure in its ability to back up its threats because of an 1874 secret mutual-defense treaty with Peru, but the Bolivians failed to consult the Peruvians in advance. In February 1879, Bolivia nationalized the mining companies, and Chilean troops went into action. On 14 February, they occupied the port of Antofagasta against no opposition; soon they were in control of the entire province. Not wanting to get involved in the fighting, Peru offered to mediate a peace settlement. Chile then learned of the secret treaty and, accusing the Peruvians of duplicity, declared war on them on 5 April 1879.

The combined Bolivian and Peruvian effort appeared daunting, especially since they had a combined population twice that of Chile, and Peru had a fairly good navy. However, Chile had a stronger and more stable central government, a more motivated population, a well-trained army, and a navy armed with two modern ironclads. Also, the main theater of operations was handier to Chile; the Bolivians had to cross the Andes, and the Peruvians had to cross the desert. All three countries were in economic trouble, but Chile was in the best financial shape and had the assistance of the British because the mining operations were mainly theirs. Both Bolivia and Peru had defaulted on British loans and angered the British by nationalizing the companies, so they had no qualms about supporting Chile.

The key battle of the war took place at sea on 8 October 1879, when the Chilean ironclads captured a Peruvian commerce raider, the Huascar, that had been hurting their trade and logistical operations. With control of the sea, Chile could supply its troops more efficiently, and the army was soon marching through Bolivian territory into Peru. Bolivia withdrew from the conflict in mid-1880 when Chilean troops occupied large parts of Peru. After a difficult battle, the Chileans captured the capital city of Lima in January 1881, effectively winning the war. Peruvians continued to fight a guerrilla war for two years, but on 20 October 1883 they gave up and signed the Treaty of Ancon. The treaty gave Chile the province of Tarapaca forever and two other provinces for 10 years, after which a referendum was to be held to determine their nationality. The referendum never took place, but in 1929 the two countries agreed to return the province of Tacna to Peru, while Chile kept the province of Arica.

The Bolivians signed an armistice with Chile in April 1884, in which they ceded the province of Antofagasta to Chile, but cession was not official until 1904, when a treaty was finally signed. That treaty obliged the Chileans to pay an indemnity and build a railroad from the Bolivian capital of La Paz to the coast of Arica. The railroad was completed in 1913.

With their army already mobilized, the Chilean government decided to use it to deal with the Araucanian Indians, a tribe that had been fighting for their land since colonial times. Hopelessly outnumbered and outsupplied, after two years the Indians were forced to sign a treaty in 1883 that placed them on reservations, though they were allowed to maintain tribal government and laws. Chile consolidated the rugged territory that had been the Araucanian homeland. With Peru bankrupt and Bolivia isolated, Chile became the strongest nation on South America’s west coast. Control of the area’s copper and nitrate meant an improving income, but close ties to Britain kept them from enjoying it totally. Chile decided to honor the Peruvian bonds issued when the Tarapaca mines were nationalized, and British speculators had been buying them up ever since Peru could not fulfill them. Thus, the British were able to control 70 percent of the nitrate production by 1890, as well as profit from their own construction of banks, railroads, and subsidiary businesses. Longstanding ties between Britain and the Chilean upper class made the British acquisition smoother, and some Chileans were able to profit from investments in British concerns.

References: Keen, Benjamin, and Mark Waserman, A Short History of Latin America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984); Loveman, Brian, The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Sater, William, Chile and the War of the Pacific (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986).

Western Colonial Naval Power

The real technological edge enjoyed by the West in this period was naval. There was no real equivalent in the non-Western world to Europe's naval superiority, which bestowed at least three advantages on the invaders. The first was power projection. If Europe discovered the world from the fifteenth century, and not vice versa, it was because the capability in the form of well-built ships had married the motivation to sail forth and conquer. Navies gave the West strategic reach, a means of passage to the most distant corners of the earth opposed only by the caprice of nature and the ships of rival European navies. As A.T. Mahan noted in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 'if Britain could be declared the winner in the imperial race, the credit, or blame, resided with the superiority of the Royal Navy'. A second benefit of naval superiority for imperialists was security: In the early days when Europeans were on the defensive on land, especially in Africa and the East, they seized coastal enclaves, often islands like Goa, St Louis de Senegal, Hong Kong or Singapore, which they could defend and supply by sea. Precarious frontier posts like Montreal might have succumbed to Amerindian constriction had their communications depended exclusively on overland routes.

Finally, sea power meant operational and even tactical mobility, which could translate into strategic advantage. Sea power was the force multiplier for the British. The British ability to shift their troops up and down the coast in India was an important element in their victory over the French there. In 1762, British maritime expeditions sent to punish Spain for her alliance with France in the Seven Years War seized both Manila and Havana. In North America, the Royal Navy gave Britain the decisive edge over France, a country with three times the population and ten times the army: Maritime expeditions swept up French settlements around the Bay of Fundy in 1710, captured Louisbourg in 1745 (and again in 1758), and imposed a blockade which, by stemming the supply of gunpowder, munitions and muskets, began the unravelling of France's Amerindian alliances as far inland as the Great Lakes, the Ohio Valley and Louisiana. A seaborne strike in 1759, behind a screen of men-of-war blockading French ports, allowed Britain to pierce the heart of New France at Quebec, rescuing what, until then, had been a fumbling campaign of attrition against the southern glacis of French Canada. And although the French Navy - La Royale returned the favour twenty-two years later at Yorktown, sea power had made land operations against New France a leisurely march to a foregone conclusion. British maritime expeditions had harvested so many islands of the French Antilles by 1762 that British diplomats attempting to negotiate a peace were embarrassed by their nation's military success. British sea power forced Napoleon to abandon the reconquest of Saint Domingue (Haiti) in 1803.

Dominance of the Pacific was essential for the victory of the rebellious South American colonies, who promoted Lord Cochrane, a disgraced Scottish aristocrat, to the rank of admiral, and launched a successful amphibious assault on Lima, an oasis in the desert, from Valparaiso in Chile in 1820. Foreign corsairs organized a small fleet to assault Spanish ships in the Caribbean.

Brown-water operations were also a feature of imperial warfare. Lake Champlain and the Richelieu river provided a classic invasion route into and out of New France. During the Second Seminole War, the United States Navy operated steamboats on the larger rivers while oared, flat-bottomed Mackinaw boats, capable of carrying twenty, moved men along the tributaries. This permitted American troops and volunteers to re-establish their presence in central Florida, abandoned to the Seminole chief Osceola in 1835. Without the support of the Russian navy, the string of posts along the Black Sea created to sever supplies from Turkey to Shamil would undoubtedly have fallen to Murid attacks. Following the Crimean War, these maritime outposts served as bases of operations against the Cherkess population of the western Caucasus. British victory in the Opium War with China (1839-42) demonstrated how relatively small naval forces could impose their will even on a vast continental empire. Sea power allowed the British to transform what the imperial court in Beijing viewed as a distant dispute in Canton into a struggle which directly threatened the economic health and political stability of the empire itself. Junks and poorly defended Chinese coastal fortifications offered scant defence against twenty-five Royal Navy ships of the line, fourteen steamers, and nine support vessels carrying 10,000 troops. With this relatively small force, the British seized four important coastal trading centres, sailed up the Yangtze River to block the Grand Canal which carried much of the Celestial Empire's north-south commercial traffic, and threatened Nanking. This was enough to bring the Chinese to the peace table. However, in 1884-5 the French were far less successful in employing their navy to wring concessions from the Chinese when they attacked Formosa which, clearly, Beijing did not believe vital to its interests. The creation of a gunboat force was critical in allowing the Celestial Empire to defeat the Taiping and Nien rebellions, sparked by European encroachment, in the 1860s. Naval artillery made the walled cities held by the Taipings along the Yangtze untenable. Gun sampans and eventually gunboats on the Yellow river and Grand Canal escorted grain convoys, and linked a defensive chain of fortifications created to keep Nien forces from breaking out across the Yellow river, much as the British in the Boer War of 1899-1902 used railways to link barriers of blockhouses built to contain Boer commandos. The French pioneered river flotillas to advance up the Senegal River toward the Niger from the 1850s.

Russian Naval Operations WWI

Russian Battleship Slava

In 1914 and 1915, the British navy contained the German navy on the North Sea. The story was similar in the Mediterranean. The British, working with the French, exercised a somewhat loose control in the fall of 1914 that tightened in May 1915 when Italy joined the Allies. The Austrian navy posed a threat from its bases along the Adriatic coast but it was so badly outnumbered that its ships remained at their moorings for the next four years, except for several raids.

While on the Mediterranean, Adriatic, and Aegean the Allied navies were superior to the forces of the Central Powers, the Germans did carry out one successful operation with two cruisers, the battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau. The two warships eluded Allied patrols on their way to Istanbul, which they reached at the end of August. The German government donated the ships to the Ottoman Empire as part of its effort to recruit another ally. The German cruisers were reflagged as Ottoman ships but retained their German officers and crews. The donation played an important part in the Ottoman decision to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers in October 1914. The German ships also played an important part in defending Istanbul from attack by the British and French from the west and the Russians from the north and east. While the Russian navy controlled the Black Sea, its inferior ships were not a match for the Goeben and the Breslau.

Russian naval forces improved over the course of 1915, yet at no point were they able to contemplate action against Istanbul. This was mainly for reasons that had to do with geography and technology. Istanbul is situated at the eastern opening of the narrow, fortified waterway that connects the Black Sea to the Aegean. Not only were the German cruisers still formidable- so were the fortifications along the straits. The closure of the straits had serious economic consequences for Russia. Merchants in Russia's southern ports were not able to export grain to markets overseas, nor were they able to import needed war supplies. Russia's northern ports remained open for commerce but ice closed them for most of the long winter. While Russia controlled its coastal waters, including the Black Sea, it was effectively blockaded by the Ottoman Empire's decision to join the Central Powers. 

The Russians had ports on the Baltic, to the north, but the German navy controlled the outlets to the North Sea. Even so, the Germans had little success on the Baltic. The Germans chose to send their best ships to the North Sea, leaving a smaller force of old ships on the Baltic. The Russians, who had lost many ships in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, had a numerical advantage on the Baltic, but everyone recognized that, should the Germans choose to shuttle ships from the North Sea to the Baltic, the Russians would face a formidable enemy. They responded by employing their ships in defensive positions, particularly around the capital, St. Petersburg, and by laying extensive minefields. The Baltic became a stalemate that was different in one key respect from the North Sea, where the British successfully blockaded Germany: the Germans were still able to use the Baltic Sea to transport goods. Sweden became a key trading partner with Germany, supplying the Germans with iron ore and other essential goods.

The lessons learned at Tsushima resulted in some positive changes in the navy. The draft period for sailors was reduced to five years, the officers corps was renewed by the influx of new officers, and proposals were outlined to increase the fleet's budget. The State Council of Defense and the recently created State Duma were, however, not inclined to allocate funds to restore the navy. The Naval Department delayed building new battleships until 1909, and comprehensive renewal of the fleet's equipment was put off until 1913. According to government plans for 1908-1914, Russia had scheduled the construction of eight battleships, four battle cruisers, ten light cruisers, 53 destroyers and 30 submarines. Two light cruisers and six submarines were intended to augment the Siberian Flotilla, which replaced the Pacific Fleet in the Far East. A special naval committee was established to organize the construction of the large turbine destroyer Novik (1910-1913), which then set the trend for many future innovations in shipbuilding.

The projections and construction of the ships met the very highest requirements. Battleships of the Sevastopol-class, with a displacement of 26,000 tons, had a top speed of 24 knots and were armed with twelve 305 millimeter guns; 356 millimeter guns were designed for battle cruisers of the Ismail-class. The submarines of the Morzh and Bars-classes were designed to maintain a speed of sixteen to eighteen knots, each armed with twelve torpedo launchers.

However, new ships were commissioned only in the second half of 1914, and the majority, only between 1915 and 1917. With outdated equipment, the training of skilled crews, which in the Russian Navy had always been given the very highest priority, acquired even greater importance. Improvements in tactical training and maritime studies were assigned to Admiral Nikolay Essen, successor of the traditions of Lazarev and Butakov. Navigation under a variety of weather conditions, opening skerries and channels, and high level gun and torpedo training were all taught at the school. Great efforts to secure combat readiness were made by Admirals Lev Brusilov, Alexander Liven, Alexander Rusin, Andrey Ederguard, and Genrikh Tsyvinsky.

In the years preceding the war, the Naval Cadets Corps and Naval Engineers' School turned out midshipmen who were then promoted to officers' ranks for service in the Mediterranean. In December 1908, during one such cruise, the seamen of the battleships Slava and Tsessarevitch, the cruisers Bogatyr and Admiral Makarov, and the gunboats Gilyak and Koreyets were the first to assist the Italian town of Messina after it suffered an earthquake. A special medal was designed to commemorate the event.

Eventually the Nikolayevsky Naval War College was granted full independence. Among the classes for officers was a specialized navigation course, and among the training units was the Training Detachment of Underwater Navigation. In 1910 at Sevastopol the Officers' Aviation School was opened for the preparation of maritime aviation. The graduates of the school were instructed in flying the M-5 seaplane, which, after 1915, operated from air-carrying transports - the predecessors of present-day aircraft carriers.

The Baltic

By the outbreak of World War I, the Russian Baltic Fleet, with its four pre-dreadnought battleships, was outmatched in size by the German fleet, which possessed thirteen of the latest dreadnoughts along with other ships. Using mainly minefields and coastal batteries, the Russian Navy was assigned the special task of protecting the Gulf of Finland. Mines were planted on the very eve of the declaration of war, 18 July 1914. Due to the persistence and energy of Admirals Nikolay Essen and Viktor Kanin, a minelaying detachment under the latter's command laid 2,124 mines in only four hours, thus barring the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. However, the German Command concentrated its main forces against the British in the North Sea, restricting itself in the Baltic to occasional operations by its force of cruisers-raids that were, for the most part, unsuccessful.

On the night of 13 August 1914, one of the best German cruisers, Magdeburg, ran aground in the fog on the reefs off Odensholm Island. The Russian sailors from the Pallada and Bogatyr captured the Magdeburg's commander and 56 crewmen. The most valuable items confiscated were signal logs and code tables that were later used for decoding radio transmissions throughout the entire war.

In late September, at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, the German submarine U-26 torpedoed the cruiser Pallada. The explosion detonated the ship's ammunition, and within a few minutes the cruiser disappeared into the water along with all 597 crewmembers. Following the tragedy of the Pallada, Admiral Essen ordered that all ships be escorted by destroyers. Furthermore, he ordered the shifting of operations to the southern area of the Baltic, closer to the German sea lanes. Under Admirals Ludvig Kerber, Viktor Kanin, Captain Alexander Kolchak and others, the detachments of cruisers and torpedo boats laid 1,500 mines in enemy waters. Germany's armored cruiser Friedrich Karl, four mine-sweepers, and fifteen steamships were subsequently destroyed and the cruisers Augsburg and Gazelle seriously damaged.

In the spring of 1915, the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral Essen, died of pneumonia. Vice-Admiral Kanin, who replaced him, expanded the zone of the fleet's operations, strengthened the defenses at Aland and Moonsund Islands, and took control of the Gulf of Riga. The German U-26 sank the mine-layer Yenisei, but three months later she herself struck Russian mines and sank in the Baltic.

Organized by Signal Officer-in-Chief Adrian Nepenin and Commander Ivan Rengarten, radio intelligence proved invaluable to Russian seamen in the Baltic; by using it Rear Admiral Mikhail Bakhirev and his cruiser brigade managed to intercept the German detachment of Commodore Karf on 19 July 1915, as it returned from planting mines off Gotland Island. In the ensuing battle the cruisers Admiral Makarov, Boyan, Bogatyr and Oleg sent the cruiser Augsburg into retreat and forced the damaged mine cruiser Albatross to run aground. Under Captain Alexander Pyshnov, the cruiser Ryurik severely damaged the German cruiser Rhoone, forcing it to withdraw.

In late July 1915, the situation in the Baltic Sea changed radically. The German Command decided to transfer half its fleet to the Baltic to break through to the Gulf of Riga and destroy the Russian ships anchored there. Under the command of Vice-Admiral Eggard Schmidt, numerous mine-sweepers, fifteen German battleships, three battle cruisers eleven cruisers, and 56 destroyers approached the Irben Strait. This German armada was held in the Strait for ten days by the comparatively outdated Russian battleship Slava, under Captain Sergey Vyazemsky. Supported by the armored gunboats Khrabry and Grozyaschy and several destroyers, the Slava repulsed all enemy attempts to break through the minefield. On the night of 4 August, Schmidt sent his newest large destroyers, V-99 and V-100, into the Gulf, where they were met by the destroyer Novik under Captain Mikhail Berens. In the short battle that followed, the Novik damaged both German ships, and V-99 was driven into the minefields, where she struck a mine and sank.

The German dreadnoughts Nassau and Pozen managed to force the Slava aside and enter the Gulf of Riga, where Admiral Schmidt lost the destroyer S-31. Russia's only loss was the gunboat Sivuch, commanded by Captain Pyotr Cherkasov. The Sivuch had fought in the darkness for nearly an hour in an unequal battle with the cruiser Augsburg, two destroyers and the newly-arrived Nassau and Pozen. The heroic vessel fought to the last, then sank under the ensign of St. Andrew. The year closed in the Baltic to the accompaniment of exploding Russian mines, striking the enemy cruisers Bremen, Danzig, Lubek and the destroyers V-191 and S-177.

In May of 1916, the submarine Volk, commanded by Captain Ivan Messer, destroyed three German transports, while, with the destroyers Novik, Pobeditel and Grom, Rear Admiral Alexander Kolchak sank the enemy auxiliary cruiser German in the Norrkoping Gulf. The Germans attempted to attack the Russians at the mouth of the Gulf of Riga in October, but this retaliatory action proved to be a disastrous miscalculation. Of Captain Viting's eleven newest destroyers, seven struck mines and sank.

The Black Sea

Before dawn on 16 October 1914, sudden explosions were heard at the port of Odessa and off the coast of Sevastopol. The Commander-in-Chief of the allied German-Turkish Fleet, Rear Admiral Wilhelm Suschon, decided to surprise the Russian seamen with another attack similar to the one at Port Arthur. At Odessa the Turkish destroyer Gairet fired a torpedo that sank the gunboat Donets, while, off Sevastopol, the battle cruiser Geben forced the sailors of the minelayer Prut to scuttle their vessel. A bold attempt by Captain Vladimir Trubetskoy to stop the Geben with a division of small destroyers failed because the leading destroyer, Lieutenant Pushchin, became seriously damaged at the outstart. The Geben began to shell the Sevastopol but was driven off by shore batteries and the older battleship Georgy Pobedonosets.

The success of this surprise attack by German and Turkish forces was largely due to new restrictions imposed by the military-political leadership on the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Andrey Ebergard. The Black Sea Fleet was superior in strength, but the large and fast Geben proved to be an important advantage to the German-Turkish Command.

The primary mission of the Black Sea Fleet was to blockade the Bosporus and Zongulak, a region that produced coal for fuelling ships. From October 1914 to February 1915, Admiral Ebergard made ten voyages to the Anatolian coast with a total squadron of five battleships, cruisers and torpedo boats. Having planted mines on the approaches to the Bosporus, the Russian sailors sank fourteen Turkish steamships and over 50 sailing vessels. On 5 November 1914, Admiral Suschon once again tried to take the Black Sea Fleet by surprise, but this time the German attempt failed. Under Captain Valery Galanin, the flag battleship Evstafy hit the Geben with the first salvo and forced her to retreat.

After a failed attempt to cross the Dardanelles in early 1915, the English and French landed a large force on the Galliopoli Peninsula. This would have allowed the Russian troops to land in the Bosporus and radically alter the outcome of the war with Turkey. However, the Russian landing did not take place because of poor cooperation between the allies and the weakness of the Russian High Command, which did not effectively coordinate the actions of its army and navy.

Only three times, in the spring of 1915, did the Black Sea Fleet bombard fortifications in the Bosporus from the battleships Tri Svyatitelya, Panteleymon and Rostislav. On its March voyage to the Bosporus, the seaplane carrier Emperor Nicholas I saw its first military action, while aircraft carriers patrolled the coast and shelled enemy batteries.

In retaliation for the bombardment of the Bosporus, Suschon decided to fire upon Odessa, but the cruiser Madzhidie was blown up and sunk by Russian mines. The Geben was also damaged by a mine and consequently rendered temporarily inoperable.

On 27 June 1915, the submersible mine-layer Crab, commanded by Senior-Lieutenant Lev Fenshow, planted 58 mines off the Bosporus. Later, in July 1916, the officer in charge, Captain Vyacheslav Klochkovsky, directed the Crab's mine laying expeditions in the mouth of the Strait. For his success in these operations, Klochkovsky was awarded the golden sword of St. George.

In August 1915, during the Battle of Kefken, the submarine Nerpa, together with the destroyers Pronzitelny and Bystry, under Captain Trubetskoy, attacked a Turkish convoy consisting of the cruiser Gamidie, two destroyers and four transports. All enemy transports were sunk, while the escort ships barely escaped.

In the campaign of 1916 the submarine Tulen, under Senior-Lieutenant Mikhail Kititsin, distinguished herself when she destroyed and captured six steamships, three launches and 21 sailing vessels. In September 1916, Kititsin attacked the heavily armed German transport Rodosto, forced it to surrender and towed it to Sevastopol. In September 1915, Admiral Ebergard hoisted his flag on the Empress Maria, the fleet's newest dreadnought, for its first campaign against the Turks; the powerful ship was fully capable of competing single-handedly against the Geben. On 24 January 1916, the Empress Maria appeared at the head of the fleet off Zongulak, but remained in a screened position since the main blow was delivered by eleven seaplanes from two seaplane carriers. Lying at the pier, the Turkish steamship Irmingard was sunk during the bombardment.

In the summer of 1916, energetic Vice-Admiral Alexander Kolchak took command of the Black Sea Fleet. Under his leadership, exit from the Bosporus was almost completely blocked by Russian mines. Constantinople remained without coal, and passage out of the Strait became difficult for all German cruisers and submarines. Under Admiral Kolchak's command, the naval approaches to Varna were also mined. In October the cruiser Pamyat Mercuria, under the flag of Rear Admiral Kazimir Porembsky, and the destroyer Pronzitelny destroyed the supply of oil left in Constantsa by the retreating Rumanians.

However, the Black Sea Fleet also suffered significant losses. The destroyers Lieutenant Pushchin and Zhivuchy struck enemy mines and sank. Especially devastating was the loss of the Empress Maria at Sevastopol after an onboard explosion on 7 October 1916.

1917

Russian sailors not only fought in the Baltic and Black Seas but also in the Mediterranean and Pacific. By 1914, together with Allied ships, the Siberian cruisers Askold and Zhemchug had already begun escorting transports and pursuing German raiders. The campaign ended badly for the Zhemchug. After hoisting the British ensign and mounting a false funnel, the German cruiser Emden, took the Zhemchug unawares and sank her at the port of Penang. The Zhemchug's Commander Ivan Cherkasov was reprimanded and demoted for his carelessness.

The fate of the Askold proved more fortunate. In late 1914 she was already fighting in the Mediterranean, and in December, commanded by Captain Sergey Ivanov, the Askold captured the German transport Haifa and destroyed two Turkish steamships. During the next year the Askold joined the newly formed Allied British-French fleet to fight in the Dardanelles. In 1915, the cruiser sailed approximately 17,000 miles. In late 1916, after repairs at Toulon, the Askold joined the Arctic Flotilla.

This flotilla emerged from the detachment formed in September 1914 to defend the port area of Arkhangelsk. A new port, Romanov-on-Murman, was constructed on the shore of the Gulf of Kola and became the terminus of the railway that extended into the polar region. Thus, a convenient and secure communication link was established between Russia and the Allies. The recently formed Arctic Flotilla aimed to ensure the protection of this vital searoute and included ships from the Pacific Fleet: the Chesma, which had been purchased from Japan, and the cruiser Varyag [Viking]. The Siberian Fleet contributed the minelayer Ussury and six destroyers. Afterwards, Vice-Admiral Ludvig Kerber was appointed Commander-in-Chief over the northern fleet. The first Russian naval success in the far North was on 20 October 1916. The destroyer Grozovoy, under Lieutenant Korneyev, sank the German submarine U-56 in a battle in the Barents Sea.

By early 1917, the Russian fleet was again a formidable force and included 558 combat ships, a number of launches, and over 500 auxiliary transport vessels. In construction were fifteen battleships, fourteen cruisers and 269 naval planes. The personnel of the Fleet totaled 168 thousand officers and men.

However, the political crisis in February 1917, immediately affected the Navy's efficiency. In February 1917, Emperor Nicholas II abdicated and the Provisional Government came to power. At Helsinki and Kronstadt, the largest Baltic ports, sailors began to riot. Dozens of admirals and officers were killed, including the Commander of the Baltic Fleet, Vice-Admiral Adrian Nepenin, and the Chief Officer of the Port of Kronstadt, Admiral Robert Viren. The effectiveness of the Baltic Fleet fell sharply. Germany took advantage of the political turmoil in Russia and began a series of attacks aimed at the weakest link in Russia's fleet, its submarines. Within a short time six had been destroyed, including the Bars, Lvitsa, Gepard and Yedinorog.

In late September Germany undertook a large-scale landing operation on the Moon Sound Islands. Vice-Admiral Eggard Schmidt arrived with more than 300 vessels carrying 25,000 assault troops. The Commander of the Baltic Fleet, Rear Admiral Alexander Razvozov, could call up only two battleships, three cruisers, three gunboats and 21 destroyers under Vice-Admiral Mikhail Bakhirev. Nonetheless, the smaller Russian force mounted strong resistance to the German squadron. Unlike the army, the navy remained loyal to the increasingly embattled Russian government.

In Kassar Bay the Eleventh Destroyer Division of Commander Georgy Pilsudsky distinguished itself in battle. Fighting alongside the gunboat Khrabry, the destroyers Pobeditel, Zabiyaka, Konstantin and Grom resisted an attack by thirteen German destroyers and the battleship Kaiser. The Grom was lost in the fight, but while under enemy fire, the Khrabry, managed to break through to the burning Grom and save her crew. Lieutenant Anatoly Waksmouth was the last to leave the deck of the Grom. At Kassar Bay Russians damaged six German destroyers while three others-B-98, B-111 and S-64- struck mines and were damaged.

In an unequal fight at Kuivaste the 4-gun battleship Slava, under Captain Vladimir Antonov, fought the German dreadnoughts Koenig and Kroneprinz, each armed with ten 12-inch guns. The Slava had to be scuttled because of the damage it incurred during the battle. However, the enemy could not intercept the Russian ships retreating from the Gulf of Riga, and the Battle of Moon Sound ended.

The Battle of Moon Sound was the last fought by the Russian fleet under the ensign of St. Andrew. 

The Black Sea Fleet of Vice-Admiral Kolchak maintained its morale and continued to blockade the enemy's coast until the summer of 1917, when revolutionary upheavals reached the Black Sea.

In Petrograd, on 25 October 1917, Vladimir Lenin and his Bolshevik cohorts seized power. The new government brought the war to a close, and, in December 1917, an armistice was signed with Germany. By the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars, 29 January 1918, the Russian Fleet was declared dissolved and the creation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet was proclaimed.