Indian carrier Vikrant played a key role in enforcing a naval blockade over East Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Ghazi was the only long range submarine operated
by either of the warring nations in 1965. The sinking of PNS Ghazi
played a point of turning role in Indian Naval operations in East
Pakistan.
INS Khukri was a British Type 14 (Blackwood-class)
frigate of the Indian Navy. She was sunk off the coast of Diu, Gujarat,
India by the Pakistan Navy Daphne-class submarine Hangor on 9 December
1971 during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. This was the first warship
sunk in action by a submarine since World War II. It remains the Indian
navy’s only warship to be lost in war to date.
The departure of the British from the subcontinent in 1947 had left
the borders of India and Pakistan demarcated fairly well except in the
west along the Rann of Kutch where the great Indus river loses itself in
a giant swamp with only a few clearly marked outlets into the sea. The
northern portion of the border has always been turbulent owing to the
invasion of Kashmir’s territory by Pakistan-sponsored tribesmen in a bid
to absorb the state, of which the ruler was undecided which way he
should accede in 1947. The subsequent war in 1948 resulted in a
cease-fire line which has been active ever since. Pakistan, which is a
theocratic state, claims Kashmir on the grounds that the population is
predominantly Muslim. India rejects this claim as absurd particularly as
secular India has more Muslims than Pakistan. The attitude adopted by
Pakistani leaders since 1947 has been to focus the attention of its
people on Kashmir as a `burning’ issue, thereby attempting to weld them
together as a cohesive small nation threatened by a big bullying
neighbour.
In early 1965, the ill-demarcated border in the Rann of Kutch was the
scene of a fire fight which was later taken to the world court for
adjudication. By May of that year, the month before the monsoon breaks,
it was clear to the armed forces of both countries that the possibility
of a conflagration existed and normal states of readiness were raised by
each service according to its own procedures. These realistic steps
were taken by everyone with the full knowledge that the border question
in the Rann of Kutch was a red herring, a minor diversion intended to
distract attention away from the real issue, which was Pakistan’s
attempt to annex Kashmir.
Immediately after the monsoon began to peter out in northern India,
Pakistani infiltrators in large numbers slipped into Kashmir where their
co-religionists promptly gave them up to the Indian authorities. This
operation, which had been planned and executed in secrecy from Pakistan
over a number of months, failed catastrophically. To pull the chestnuts
out of the fire, a regular Pakistan army blitzkrieg was launched
opposite Jammu, with the intention of cutting the only Indian road link
to Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. The possibility that this strike
would succeed was real. The Indian army leadership had to launch a
counteroffensive opposite Lahore to outflank the Pakistani thrust and
relieve the pressure on Jammu. The war, although anticipated to some
extent as a possible long-term outcome, therefore actually occurred in a
time and place that initially caught the Indians, and later the
Pakistanis, by surprise. The war, as an instrument of state policy, in
this instance, was far from the sea, was fought over disputed territory
and neither side had great staying power economically or industrially.
The stamina of both sides was further reduced by the consequent
international arms embargo imposed at the outbreak of war.
What kind of a sea war could have influenced this conflict? The
Pakistan navy had a modest destroyer force, was in the process of
inducting one submarine from the US and had its own integral maritime
reconnaissance aircraft. The Indians had a larger navy, centred around
the small carrier Vikrant supported by new anti-submarine and AD
frigates-a navy which was a miniature version of a sea-control navy,
modelled around the British concepts of maritime strategy. Whatever may
have been its operational directives, neither fleet saw action, being
content to protect the areas in which their own merchantmen plied. A
Pakistan destroyer which lobbed a few shells on to the Indian coast in a
high speed night sortie was the one night sensation of the naval war.
Naval control of shipping and contraband control was attempted, but was
not stringent enough to cause substantial economic damage.
A debrief of the war, certainly in India, showed that the comparative
lack of action at sea had been caused by certain automatic adherence to
a maritime strategy which spoke of sea control, commerce protection and
other well-established principles of maritime warfare, the tenets on
which the sea war in World War II had been conducted. Having been taught
by the British, the Indian navy had also accepted many of the precepts
on which the British Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (on loan to India in
1947-48) had formulated his plans for building the future navy.
Explanations to the non-naval authorities on the undramatic role of the
navy in the war, which ran into arguments on sea control and commerce
protection, were politely disbelieved. Questions on the relevance of sea
power in the kind of conflicts that India would fight in the next 25
years were also raised. These queries could naturally be expected to
have an adverse effect on the allocation of resources for the future
navy. These facts need to be understood as the background for the war
which occurred in 1971.
Pakistan, which had a western wing and an eastern wing separated by
1,000 miles of India, soon found itself fighting to preserve its unity
as a nation, when the eastern wing wished to secede. The trouble erupted
over the fact that the eastern wing felt economically neglected, a
situation which they felt they could correct if their superior numbers
could elect a majority in the combined parliament. This would influence
the subsequent allotment of cabinet portfolios and allocation of central
resources. West Pakistani elected representatives would not agree to a
straightforward democratic parliament, and the civil strife in East
Pakistan was suppressed with appalling brutality. Over ten million
refugees migrated to India, a number far too large for India to absorb.
When the United Nations and the world seemed unconcerned with the
problem, the only solution appeared to be Indian intervention. This
situation continued for the major part of 1971 after the initial
suppression of civil revolt in the former East Pakistan occurred in
March/April. In this instance, too, the armed contestants on both sides
were fully aware of impending hostilities for almost six months and had
sufficient time to work out detailed strategies.
The war broke out with a Pakistani attempt to carry out a preemptive
air strike against Indian airfields in the west, and then both sides
executed well-planned orders. All wars are unusual, but this one had its
own special features, especially from the maritime point of view. The
aim of the war would obviously be achieved only by soldiers in the
eastern wing. However, an irrelevant land war would be fought in the
west too, rather like a fishing expedition, to see what territories
could be grabbed for use as bargaining tools at the end of the war.
There were, therefore, two continental wars proceeding simultaneously,
separated by 2,000 miles of ocean. For India it was therefore possible
to exercise the classic role of sea control, encompassing sea denial,
between the wings, but what could be the navy’s role in the wars in the
wings themselves? For Pakistan, a successful defence in the east made
sea communications between the wings an imperative, but this was so
hopelessly impossible that it was not even attempted except by a couple
of blockade runners which were captured and impounded.
The land war in the east lasted 11 days; the Pakistan navy fought,
knowing it had no hope of help or reinforcement and no route of
withdrawal. The fact that the sea was hostile must have played a major
part in the psychology of Pakistani field commanders in the east.
Although no major sea battle took place, Indian carrier-borne aircraft
crippled or sank all available shipping in East Pakistani harbours.
The
absence of major battles illustrates the classical Mahanian observation-
that unobtrusive application of sea power achieves the end result in
such an imperceptible fashion that the effect of sea power needs to be
overemphasised for it to be understood. The Indian maritime strategy in
the east was in sharp contrast to the strategy in the west, where an
Indian flotilla of Petya class vessels towing Osa class missile boats
attacked Karachi harbour and sank all vessels encountered there. The
dramatic effect of the `enemy’ main base being battered so captured the
imagination of the Indian government, the bureaucracy, the services and
the people that the navy never had to explain what navies are for! The
Pakistani navy, forever kept short of funds by the ruling army generals,
eventually had a manpower ratio to the army of 1:45, making it the most
unfavourable in the world. This statistic also proclaimed that in the
strategic concepts prevailing in Islamabad in its pursuit to annex
Kashmir, and in the inevitable bloody continental war with India, the
Pakistani navy would play no role.
The Indians, on the other hand, have continued to build a balanced
navy and should a continental war erupt once more, would have
considerable time and experience in attempting to solve the question of
how a navy can contribute to a continental war. From having learned that
a pure ocean-oriented maritime strategy does not affect the outcome of a
critical land war, India has learned that a pure Mahanian strategy is
not relevant in the context of a land war over disputed territory. Then,
what sort of strategy is? The uneducated section of the country can be
satisfied by some action, any action. This takes care of the largest
interest group- the people. What about the professionals? What about the
pressures generated among the armed forces themselves over the pursuit
and achievement of a common aim? This is a problem with which sea-going
professionals in the subcontinent will have to grapple. It will be
interesting to see what answers are found to all these questions; in
fact, whether any answers will be found at all. What is evident is the
need for a search, which may lead to the answer that other navies in
similar situations also seek.
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